Broadcasting Private Messages Securely by Czap, Laszlo et al.
Broadcasting Private Messages Securely
László Czap
EPFL, Switzerland
Email: laszlo.czap@epfl.ch
Vinod M. Prabhakaran
TIFR, India
Email: vinodmp@tifr.res.in
Suhas Diggavi
UCLA, USA
Email: suhas@ee.ucla.edu
Christina Fragouli
EPFL, Switzerland
Email: christina.fragouli@epfl.ch
Abstract—Consider a source, Alice, broadcasting private mes-
sages to multiple receivers through a broadcast erasure channel;
users send back to Alice public feedback that she causally uses
to decide the coding strategy for her following transmissions.
Recently, the multiple unicast capacity region for this problem
has been exactly characterized for a number of special cases;
namely the 2-user, 3-user, symmetric K-user, and one-sidedly
fair K-user [1], [2].
In this paper, we show that for all the cases where such
characterizations exist, we can also optimally characterize the
“secure” communication rates, where the message that Alice
transmits to each user is information theoretically secure from
the other users, even if these collude. We show that a simple,
two-phase strategy, where appropriate amounts of secret keys
are first generated and then consumed, matches a new outer
bound we derive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication channels are easier to eavesdrop
and harder to secure – even towards unintentional eavesdrop-
pers. As an example consider a sender, Alice, who wants
to send private messages to multiple (say three) receivers,
Bob, Calvin and David, within her transmission radius, and
assume public feedback from the receivers to Alice. When
Alice broadcasts a message W1 intended for Bob, Calvin and
David should also try to overhear, as the side information
they possibly collect can enable Alice to make her following
broadcast transmissions more efficient; but then, this collected
side information would allow Calvin and David to learn parts
of Bob’s message. Even worse, Calvin and David could try
to put together the parts they overheard, to extract increased
information about Bob’s message. Can we, in such a setting,
keep the message for each user information theoretically se-
cure from the other users, even if these collaborate? Moreover,
can we do so, when the users can only communicate through
shared wireless broadcast channels?
In this paper we answer these questions when communica-
tion happens through broadcast erasure channels. We exactly
characterize the capacity region in all the cases where the
problem has been solved with no security constraints, namely,
the 2-user, 3-user, symmetric K-user, and one-sidedly fair K-
user [2]. For each such case, we present a new outer bound
and a simple achievability scheme that matches it.
Our achievability scheme has two phases, a key-generation
and a key-consumption phase. We first create, using the erasure
channel properties, a common key between Alice and each
user, that is secure from the remaining users (even if they
collude). Key generation comes at cost since it occupies the
wireless channel without actually conveying information; we
thus need to calculate how much key we need, and effi-
ciently create it (we construct the key using similar techniques
proposed in our earlier work [3], [4]). How much key we
need depends on how we use it. A straightforward approach
would be to use each secret key as a one-time pad; this is
too pessimistic, because, when for example Alice transmits
information to Bob, Calvin and David (jointly) are going to
receive only a fraction of the packets intended for Bob and
thus we only need to create an amount of key that allows
protection of this fraction. This is exactly what the scheme
we propose does.
Our main contributions are:
• we design a simple two phase protocol, that generates
and consumes keys;
• we derive an outer bound that explicitly mirrors the
balance between key generation and key consumption,
and show that our achievability scheme matches it for
all the cases where the communication problem is solved
without security requirements;
• as a side result, we provide an alternative proof for the
outer bound of the non-secure communication problem.
A. Related Work
Secure transmission of messages using noisy channel prop-
erties was pioneered by Wyner [5], who characterized the
secret message capacity of wiretap channels. This led to a long
sequence of research on information-theoretic security on var-
ious generalizations of the wiretap channel [6], [7]. Notably,
when the eavesdropper and legitimate channel are statistically
identical, then the wiretap framework yields no security. The
fact that feedback can give security even in this case was
first observed for secret key agreement by Maurer [8] and
further developed by Ahlswede-Csiszár [9] – but secure key
agreement is not the same as secure transmission of specific
messages. The wiretap channel with secure feedback and its
variants for message security have been studied in [10], [11];
some conclusive results are developed in special cases when
there is a secure feedback inaccessible to the eavesdropper.
Security of private message broadcasting without feedback has
been studied in [12], where some conclusive results have been
established. As mentioned earlier, the use of feedback and
broadcast for private message transmission, without security
requirements has been studied in [13], [14]. We believe that
ours are the first conclusive results that use insecure (and
very limited) feedback for information-theoretic security of
multiple private messages.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM MODEL
A sender, Alice, wants to send private messages to a set of
K receivers: she wants to send message Wi to receiver i, so
that, no other receiver learns Wi, even if all other receivers
collude. For simplicity, we describe our system for the case
of three receivers, which we will refer to as Bob, Calvin and
David, respectively, but the model extends to K receivers.
a) Communication model: Communication takes place
over a 1-to-3 broadcast erasure channel, with input at Alice and
an output each at Bob, Calvin, and David. The input alphabet
of the channel consists of all possible vectors of length L over
a finite field Fq. For convenience, we usually call each such
vector a packet. We denote by Xi the ith transmission over
the channel, and by Y1,i, Y2,i, Y3,i the corresponding outputs
observed by Bob, Calvin and David. We use Xn to denote the
vector (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and similarly for other vectors also.
The broadcast channel is made up of three independent com-
ponent erasure channels with erasure probabilities δ1, δ2, δ3:
Pr {Y1,iY2,iY3,i|Xi} =
3∏
j=1
Pr {Yj,i|Xi}
∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} : Pr{Yj,i|Xi} =
{
1− δj , Yj,i = Xi
δj , Yj =⊥,
where ⊥ is the symbol of an erasure.
Further, we assume that the (erasure) state Si of the channel
during the ith transmission (i.e., which receivers experienced
erasures) is strictly causally available to all parties1; we use
when needed the notation Si = CD to denote that Calvin and
David have correctly received Xi, while Bob experienced an
erasure, and similarly for the other cases.
b) Reliability and security: The messages W1,W2 and
W3 are defined as vectors of length N1, N2 and N3 over pack-
ets. We assume that messages are independent and uniformly
distributed over their respective message space. Beside the
messages, Alice may also generate some private randomness,
which we denote ΘA.
Definition 1. A rate tuple (R1, R2, R3) ∈ R3+ is achievable
over the 1-to-3 broadcast channel defined above, if for any
" > 0 and a sufficiently large n there exist encoding maps
fi(·), and decoding maps φ1(·),φ2(·),φ3(·) such that
Xi = fi(W1,W2,W3, S
i−1,ΘA), i = 1 . . . n (1)
Pr
{
φj(Y
n
j S
n) %= Wj
}
< ", ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (2)
Rj − " <
1
n
NjL log q ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (3)
1In practice, this can be achieved by having the receivers send a low-
rate state feedback after each transmission; for large packet lengths L, the
associated overhead is low.
Definition 2. The rate tuple (R1, R2, R3) ∈ R3+ is securely
achievable, if beside (1)-(3)
I(W1;Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
n) < " (4)
I(W2;Y
n
1 Y
n
3 S
n) < " (5)
I(W3;Y
n
1 Y
n
2 S
n) < " (6)
are also satisfied.
Definition 3. The secrecy capacity region of the 1-to-3 broad-
cast erasure channel with state-feedback is the set of all
securely achievable rate tuples as defined in Definition 2.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our main result is the characterization of the secrecy
capacity region for sending private messages to K receivers
over a broadcast erasure channel, for all the cases where the
capacity without secrecy constraints has been characterized,
namely, the 2-user, 3-user, symmetric K-user and one-sidedly
fair K-user (for exact definitions see [2]).
A. The three receivers (K=3) case
Our first result, provided in Section V-A, is a new alternative
converse proof for the following known theorem [2], [1],
which characterizes the capacity region in the case of non-
secure communication.
Theorem 1. Any achievable rate tuple (R1, R2, R3) ∈ R3+ as
defined in Definition 1 satisfies
max
pi
Rpi1
1− δpi1
+
Rpi2
1− δpi1δpi2
+
Rpi3
1− δpi1δpi2δpi3
≤ L log q, (7)
where the maximization is over all permutations of {1, 2, 3}.
We denote by pii the ith element in the permutation.
We build on this to characterize the capacity region in the
case of secure communication.
Theorem 2. A rate tuple (R1, R2, R3) ∈ R3+ falls into the se-
crecy capacity region of the 1-to-3 broadcast erasure channel
with state-feedback as defined in Definition 3 if and only if
max
j∈{1,2,3}
nRj(1−
δ1δ2δ3
δj
)
(1− δj)
δ1δ2δ3
δj
(1− δ1δ2δ3)
+
max
pi
Rpi1
1− δpi1
+
Rpi2
1− δpi1δpi2
+
Rpi3
1− δpi1δpi2δpi3
≤ L log q (8)
is satisfied, where the latter maximum is taken over all possible
permutations.
The first term in (8) captures the key generation phase while
the second term, which is the same as the left-hand side of (7),
the encrypted transmission phase. To prove this theorem we
provide in Section IV a scheme that achieves any rate tuple in
the region defined by (8), and in Section V a matching outer
bound.
B. Additional cases
For all cases where we have a non-secure capacity achieving
scheme as in Theorem 1, we also have a matching secure
capacity characterization using similar techniques to those in
Theorem 2. This is the case for K = 2, if the channel param-
eter δi is the same for every receiver (symmetric channel) or
when the rate vector is one-sidedly fair. In the remaining of
the paper we focus on the K = 3 case, but indicatively, we
state the following result without proof.
Theorem 3. For a symmetric channel or for a one-sidedly fair
rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ RK+ , the secrecy capacity region of
the 1-to-K broadcast erasure channel with state-feedback is
characterized by the following inequality:
max
j∈{1,...,K}
nRj(1−
∏K
k=1 δk
δj
)
(1− δj)
∏
K
k=1 δk
δj
(1−
∏K
k=1 δk)
+
max
pi
K∑
i=1
Rpii
1−
∏i
k=1 δpik
≤ L log q,
where the second maximization is over all permutations pi of
{1, . . . ,K}.
IV. SECURE 1-TO-3 BROADCAST: ACHIEVABILITY
We first give a slightly modified version of the non-secure
capacity achieving scheme in [2], that we will use as a building
block.
A. Protocol for non-secure 1-to-3 broadcast [2]
Conceptually, this algorithm has two main steps:
Step (a) Alice repeats each message packet W1,1, . . . ,W1,N1 ,
W2,1, . . . ,W2,N2 and W3,1, . . . ,W3,N3 until at least one
of the three receivers correctly receives it.
Step (b) Alice sends linear combinations of the packets that are
not received by their intended receiver in Step (a).
A key contribution of [2] is in specifying how to construct the
linear combinations in Step (b) – we refer the reader to [2] for
the exact constructions, and highlight here the two important
properties we rely on:
• A message packet successfully delivered to its intended
receiver in Step (a) is never used in Step (b).
• The scheme achieves any rate point within the region
in (7).
B. Protocol for secure 1-to-3 broadcast
Our scheme consists of two phases.
1) Key generation. We create three different keys, each key
shared between Alice and one receiver, and perfectly
secure from the remaining two receivers even if they
collude.
2) Encrypted broadcast. Using the keys set up in the first
phase, we employ an encrypted version of the non-
secure 1-to-3 broadcast scheme described.
To describe each phase in detail, we define a few parameters.
The length of the secret keys we aim to set up for the receivers
(expressed in terms of packets) are k1, k2 and k3, and the
length of Phase 1 in terms of transmissions is n1. We define
kj = Nj
1− δ1δ2δ3δj
1− δ1δ2δ3
+
(
Nj
1− δ1δ2δ3δj
1− δ1δ2δ3
)3/4
, and
n1 = max
j∈{1,2,3}
kj + k
3/4
j
(1− δj)
δ1δ2δ3
δj
.
1) Key generation
Let KB denote the key between Alice and Bob, and
similarly for KC and KD.
Alice transmits n1 random packets X1, . . . , Xn1 generated
uniformly at random over FLq . KB is the vector of the first
k1 packets Xi for which Si = B. If there are less than k1
such packets, we stop and declare an error. Similarly, key KC
(and KD) are created using the first k2 (k3) packets for which
Si = C (Si = D), or an error is declared whenever there are
too few such packets. In other words, Alice transmits random
packets, and we treat a packet received by only one receiver
as a shared secret between Alice and that receiver.
2) Encrypted broadcast
We now follow the two transmission steps in the non-secure
protocol IV-A, with the following modifications: in Step (a),
we encrypt the message packets using key packets as we
specify in the following; in Step (b), we simply reuse the
already encrypted packets from Step (a) to create the required
linear combinations – we do not use additional key packets.
Step (2.a) Before transmitting each message packet to
receiver i, Alice encrypts it by XOR-ing it with a key packet
that is not yet used for encrypting a packet that was received
by any of the other two receivers.
Consider the transmissions to Bob. Initially Alice encrypts
Bob’s first packet as W1,1 ⊕KB,1 and transmits it until it is
received at least one of the receivers. If only Bob receives
this encrypted packet, she reuses the same key packet KB,1
to encrypt the next message packet. Subsequently, if for some
i and j < N1, k < k1: Xi = W ′1,j = W1,j ⊕KB,k, then
Xi+1 =


Xi, if Si = ∅
W ′1,j+1 = W1,j+1 ⊕KB,k, if Si = B
W ′1,j+1 = W1,j+1 ⊕KB,k+1, otherwise.
In other words, a key is reused until a packet encrypted using
it is received by one of Calvin and David. We declare an
error if the k1 key packets are not sufficient to encrypt all the
N1 message packets of W1. Similarly for the other keys and
messages.
Step (2.b) At the end of Step (2.a), Bob, Calvin and David
have received as side information encrypted packets that are
not intended for them; we use the same encoding as in Step (b)
of the non-secure protocol IV-A to deliver these packets to
their intended receivers.
C. Analysis of the secure protocol IV-B
Condition (1) is clearly satisfied by our scheme. We show
the other required properties for Bob; the same arguments
apply to Calvin and David.
We first argue that our scheme satisfies (4). From construc-
tion, we create at the end of Phase 1 a key KB with
I(KB;Y
n1
2 Y
n1
3 S
n1) = 0. (9)
In Step (2.a), every packet W ′1,j that Calvin and/or David
receive has been encrypted using a different key packet KB,i;
these key packets, from (9), are secret from Calvin and David.
Thus the packets received by Calvin and David are one-
time-pad encrypted and perfectly secret to them, even if they
collude. In Step (2.b), Alice transmits linear combinations of
packets W ′1,j that have not been received by Bob, but have
already been received either by Calvin and/or David – thus,
assuming these receivers collude, they do not receive any
innovative W ′1,j . This concludes our argument.
We next prove (2). Trivially, if no error is declared, Bob can
retrieve W1 from W ′1 using his key KB . We next show that
the probability of declaring an error can be made arbitrarily
small. It is enough to consider the following two error events
since the other error events are similar: (i) we do not obtain
k1 key packets for Bob in Phase 1, and (ii) k1 key packets are
not sufficient in Step (2.a).
(i) Denote by κ the number of packets in Phase 1 that are
received only by Bob. Then, κ is the sum of n1 i.i.d. Bernoulli
variables drawn from Ber(p), where p = (1− δ1)δ2δ3. Thus,
E {κ} = n1(1− δ1)δ2δ3 ≥ k1 + k
3/4
1 .
The probability of error event (i) equals
Pr {κ < k1} ≤ Pr
{
E {κ}− κ > k3/41
}
≤ Pr
{
|E {κ}− κ| > k3/41
}
≤ e−c
√
k1 ,
for some constant c > 0. The last inequality follows from
the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound. Selecting N1 sufficiently large,
this error probability can be made arbitrarily small.
(ii) is similar, it occurs if the number of packets that only
Bob receives is significantly less then its expected value, and
the same technique applies.
With this we have shown that the scheme satisfies (1)-
(6). A straightforward calculation with the given parameters
together with the capacity achieving property of the second
phase shows that our proposed schemes achieves any rate tuple
within the region given by (8), which concludes the proof of
achievability of Theorem 2.
V. OPTIMALITY
We show that the above scheme is optimal in terms of the
securely achieved rates by giving a matching outer bound on
the achievable rates that holds for any scheme.
Theorem 4. Any securely achievable rate tuple
(R1, R2, R3) ∈ R3+ as defined in Definition 2 satisfies
max
j∈{1,2,3}
nRj(1−
δ1δ2δ3
δj
)
(1− δj)
δ1δ2δ3
δj
(1− δ1δ2δ3)
+
max
pi
Rpi1
1− δpi1
+
Rpi2
1− δpi1δpi2
+
Rpi3
1− δpi1δpi2δpi3
≤ L log q
Proof: We are going to show that for any j and any pi
nRj(1−
δ1δ2δ3
δj
)
(1− δj)
δ1δ2δ3
δj
(1− δ1δ2δ3)
+
Rpi1
1− δpi1
+
Rpi2
1− δpi1δpi2
+
Rpi3
1− δpi1δpi2δpi3
≤ L log q (10)
holds, which implies the statement of the theorem. Also,
to avoid cumbersome notation we show (10) for j = 1 and
pi = (1, 2, 3). With simple relabeling, the same argument holds
for any j and pi.
nL log q ≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) =
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
3 |Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|W1W2W3Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1) (11)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) (12)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
3 |Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) (13)
+ I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1) (14)
In the following lemmas we give bounds on each of these
terms. Lemmas 1-4 give bounds on terms (11)-(14). Combin-
ing these results together gives (10) and in turn the statement
of the theorem. The proofs of Lemmas 2-6 are delegated to
the Appendix.
A. Converse proof of Theorem 1
Proof: It is sufficient to prove the inequality for
pi = (1, 2, 3). By relabeling, the same argument holds for any
pi. By repeating the first steps of the proof of Theorem 4 and
bounding term (11) with 0, we have
nL log q ≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) (15)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
3 |Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) (16)
+ I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1) (17)
Lemmas 2-4 give bounds on terms (15)-(17) respectively.
Combining these gives the stated inequality.
Lemma 1. From conditions (1)-(4) it follows that
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 W1W2W3S
i−1)
≥
nR1(1− δ2δ3)
(1− δ1)δ2δ3(1− δ1δ2δ3)
− E8,
where E8 = E7 1−δ2δ3(1−δ1)δ2δ3 , and E7 is an error constant specified
in Lemma 7.
Proof: The statement of the lemma follows from com-
bining the results of Lemma 5 and Lemma 7.
Lemma 2. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1
−
nR1
1− δ1δ2
− E1,
where E1 = h2(#)+#L log q1−δ1 .
With a similar derivation one can prove the following
lemma. We omit the proof to avoid parallel arguments.
Lemma 3. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
3 |Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) ≥
n(R1 +R2)
1− δ1δ2
−
n(R1 +R2)
1− δ1δ2δ3
− E2,
where E2 = h2(2#)+2#L log q1−δ1δ2 .
Lemma 4. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
n(R1 +R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3
− E3
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1)
≤
n(R1 +R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3
where E3 = h2(3#)+3#L log q1−δ1δ2δ3 .
Lemma 5. From the definition of the channel it follows that
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 W1W2W3S
i−1) ≥
1− δ2δ3
(1− δ1)δ2δ3
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 W1W2W3S
i−1)
Lemma 6. From the security condition (4) it follows that
E4 >
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1),
where E4 = #1−δ2δ3 .
Lemma 7. From conditions (1)-(4) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1W2W3) ≥
nR1
1− δ1δ2δ3
− E7,
where E7 = 2E ′2 + E4 + E5 + E6, E5 =
h2(#)+#L log q
1−δ2δ3 , E6 =
h2(#)+#L log q
1−δ1δ2δ3 , and E
′
2 =
h2(2#)+2#L log q
1−δ2δ3 .
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In our security model we assume honest-but-curious adver-
saries. This means that the security of our scheme relies on the
honest feedback from every party. Related relevant problems
are when the adversary is a passive eavesdropper and does
not give any feedback, or when the feedback she gives can
be dishonest. Interestingly enough, in the case of one or two
parties the capacity region does not change compared to the
honest-but-curious adversary. These problems are addressed
in [4], [15], however their generalization for more than two
parties is not trivial.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF LEMMAS
A. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof:
n(R1 +R2 +R3)− E3(1− δ1δ2δ3)
≤ I(Y n1 Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
n;W1W2W3)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y1,iY2,iY3,iSi;W1W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y1,iY2,iY3,i;W1W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1Si)
=
n∑
i=1
Pr{Si %= ∅}·
· I(Y1,iY2,iY3,i;W1W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1, Si %= ∅)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1)(1− δ1δ2δ3)
Here, the first inequality is Fano’s inequality, besides, we
exploited the independence property of Si. This completes the
proof of the first inequality of the lemma. Further, we also see
that
I(Y n1 Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
n;W1W2W3) ≤ n(R1 +R2 +R3),
which by a similar argument gives the second inequality of
the lemma.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: From the same type of derivation as we apply in
Lemma 4, we have that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1
− E1
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) ≤
nR1
1− δ1δ2
.
Thus,
nR1
1− δ1
− E1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)− I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1W1)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)
≤
nR1
1− δ1δ2
+
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) (18)
C. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: We apply the shorthand W 3 = W1W2W3.
0 ≤ H(Y n1 S
n|Y n2 Y
n
3 S
nW 3)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n2 Y
n
3 S
nW 3)
+H(Y1,nSn|Y
n−1
1 Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
nW 3)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1W 3)
− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Y2,nY3,nSn|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1W 3)
+H(Y1,n|Y
n−1
1 Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
nW 3)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1W 3)
− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Y2,nY3,n|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1SnW 3)
+H(Y1,n|Y
n−1
1 Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
nW 3)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1W 3)
− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Y2,nY3,n|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1Sn /∈ {∅, B}W 3)·
· Pr {Sn /∈ {∅, B}}
+H(Y1,n|Y
n−1
1 Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
n−1, Sn = B,W 3)·
· Pr {Sn = B}
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1W 3)
− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Xn|Y n−12 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1W 3)(1− δ2δ3)
+H(Xn|Y
n−1
1 Y
n−1
2 Y
n−1
3 S
n−1W 3)(1− δ1)δ2δ3
We do the same steps recursively to obtain the statement of
the lemma.
D. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: From (4), we have that
" > I(Y n2 Y
n
3 S
n;W1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1)(1 − δ2δ3)
We omitted the intermediate steps that are in the same vein as
in the proof of Lemma 4.
E. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof:
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1W2W3)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1)
− I(Xi;W2W3|Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1)
+ I(Xi;W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1)
From (2) and Fano’s inequality we have
I(Y n2 Y
n
3 S
n;W2W3|W1) ≤
I(Y n2 Y
n
3 S
n;W2W3)− (h2(") + "L log q).
Following the proof of Lemma (4), we can write
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1) + E5,
and from the independence property of the messages
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1),
where E5 = h2(#)+#L log q1−δ2δ3 . This allows us to use the same idea
as in Lemma 4 to bound these terms. Doing so gives us
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1W2W3)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1) (19)
−
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ2δ3
+
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3
− E ′2 − E5,
where E ′2 =
h2(2#)+2#L log q
1−δ2δ3 . It remains to give a bound on
term (19). From Lemma 6 and after a few basic steps we can
arrive at
E4 >
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1W1)
+ I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1)
+ I(X1;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1) (20)
From a parallel result as in Lemma 4:
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1δ2δ3
− E6,
where E6 = h2(#)+#L log q1−δ1δ2δ3 . Further, a symmetric result to
Lemma 3 shows:
I(X1;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 Y
i−1
3 S
i−1) ≥
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ2δ3
−
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3
− E ′2.
Applying these bounds in (20) and then substituting back to
(19) results the claim of the lemma.
